The Triad of Science Foundations, Instructional Technology, and Organizational Structure. by Vargas, E.A.
Over the centuries and across all societies educational achievement does not improve.
The attempt to improve the instructional process has concentrated on instructional
technology. But these attempts have overlooked the importance of two other factors: the
science that should underlie the instructional technologies and the organization that must
operate those technologies. A considerable step forward in handling the problems of
instructional effectiveness has been the derivation of instructional technologies based on
Skinnerian science. But the instructional technologies based on Skinner’s analysis of
behavior are promoted as if they were to operate in an organizational vacuum. The division
of labor, and its necessary coordination and control, is taken for granted. But in any large
scale enterprise, the organization of the division of labor must fit the technology through
which that enterprise achieves its mission. Educational technology must tie directly to a
pertinent science and to a proper organizational structure. To teach effectively requires
an overhaul along three lines: 1) a relevant science that reflects and encapsulates an
accurate understanding of behavior; 2) a contingency-based technology of instruction that
directly derives its practices upon proper scientific principles; and 3) a suitable organization
based on teaching teams that operate the new instructional technology.
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A lo largo de los siglos y en todas las sociedades la educación no ha avanzado. Los
intentos de mejorar el proceso de instrucción se han concentrado en la tecnología de la
instrucción. Pero estos intentos no han tenido en cuenta la importancia de otros dos
factores: la ciencia que debería fundamentar las tecnologías de la instrucción y la
organización que utiliza esas tecnologías. Un importante paso adelante en el manejo de
los problemas de la eficacia instruccional ha sido la formulación de tecnologías de la
instrucción basadas en la ciencia skinneriana. Sin embargo, las tecnologías de la instrucción
basadas en el análisis de la conducta skineriano se promueven como si hubieran de
operar en un vacío organizacional. La división del trabajo, y su necesaria coordinación y
control, se dan por supuestas. Pero en cualquier proyecto a gran escala, la organización
de la división del trabajo debe ajustarse a la tecnología mediante la cual ese proyecto
cumple su misión. La tecnología educacional debe ligarse directamente a una ciencia
pertinente y a una estructura organizativa adecuada. Enseñar eficazmente requiere una
reforma en tres direcciones: 1) una ciencia relevante que refleje y encapsule una
comprensión adecuada de la conducta; 2) una tecnología de la instrucción basada en la
contingencia que derive su práctica de principios científicos correctos; y 3) una organización
adecuada basada en equipos docentes que empleen la nueva tecnología de la instrucción.
Palabras clave: Tecnología de la Instrucción, Estructura organizacional, Skinner
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And mysteries
are like the sun, dazzling, yet plain to all eyes.
John Donne (1633/1991)
We get no closer to solving our primary educational
mystery—that of teaching well.  Despite the patronage,
despite the support, despite the exertions, and despite the
complaints, criticisms, and constant demands that education
reinvent itself and despite the dictates on how that
reinvention should occur, the effectiveness and efficiency
of school systems throughout the world remain at their usual
modest level. Oh, here or there, a bright spot sparkles. But
the occasional happy accident provides no solution for the
mundane modus operandi of other educational institutions.
If it did, what school would not adopt what works
elsewhere? Such happy accidents result from circumstances
not replicable elsewhere; an outcome that proponents of
voucher systems overlook. The excellence of one school
does not translate automatically into the excellence of all
schools. If it did, the snarls over the public schools’ ineptness
would be low and few. In the United States, the currently
hyped market fix insists on a shotgun marriage between
evolutionist Charles Darwin and capitalist Adam Smith that
would give birth to schools that succeed and abort those
that fail. But market driven schools already operate. A
privately funded variant of voucher programs already
operates in thousands of private schools, many with
advantageous funding, involved parents, motivated students,
and competent staff. Even with those advantages, most
private schools find it difficult to outperform their public
school counterparts. More important, they have produced
no instructional innovations whose currency would rescue
the presumed bankruptcy of the public schools.
Many fixes are promoted. Each has its acronym and its
advocates, and each has its value. But each provides only
a shard of the solution to a very old problem—the problem
of a routinely productive educational system; a problem
whose completely constructed answer still eludes us. Such
a conclusion does not indict the public school, or the private
one. It simply points to a continuing difficulty and to
previous failures to correct it. The market fix, whether
vouchers or some other, the tool fix, whether computers or
some other, or the socialization fix, whether family values
or some other, have not solved, and show no signs of
solving, the central and brutal difficulty of an effective
instructional system—how to teach so that all students
achieve a predefined criterion of excellence. 
Science, Technology, and Organization
Successful Institutional Effort
We can address the problem by asking a simple
question, “Why is it that no society routinely educates all
students to that level of excellence of which they are
capable?”. We are not talking about the education of an
elite. We are talking about the education of craftsmen and
intellectuals, of writers and bakers, of scientists and
mechanics, of citizens and parents, of consumers and
producers of economic and political goods. Such an
accomplishment would equal the accomplishment of other
institutional sectors of society. Why can’t educational
organizations produce repertoires of consistently high quality
as routinely as airplane manufacturers produce high quality
jet airliners? Each day thousands of flights occur in which
aircraft lift tons of metal, cargo, and people into the air
with only the occasional headline of an accident as a
reminder of how rarely one occurs. Why hasn’t the
educational sector seen the equivalent advance as say the
transportation field? Our own feet and the feet of other
animals still transport us, but the twentieth century saw the
beginnings of flights to the moon from the beginnings of
flight for a few seconds over the sand dunes of a quiet sea
shore. Or consider a commonly overlooked endeavor, the
agricultural sector: The achievement of the American farmer
is so great that we take for granted the presence of
inexpensive and nutritious food in the market place, at the
restaurant, and for much of the rest of the world. The
efficiency of quality food production is so good that in the
United States its required labor force went from a proportion
that needed almost everyone, ninety-five percent or so three
centuries ago, to about five percent today, just a small
fraction of those who work. How do these other societal
advances compare to those in the educational sector? The
problems of producing jet airplanes would seem no greater
than the problems of producing capable students. The
problems of moving large numbers of people quickly and
safely over land and sea and through air and into space
would seem no less challenging than teaching them. The
problems of feeding huge numbers of people cheaply and
nutritionally would seem no less difficult than training them.
We solved these problems, continue to improve on the
solutions, yet persistently flounder in solving our problems
of mass education.
What distinguishes these efforts and those made within
education where exertions are as great? Obviously the
difference is not due to lack of trying or intelligence or
resources. The people in education work hard, master
complex subjects, and all societies dedicate a substantial
portion of their national income to educate their young.
Wherein lies the difference? The difference resides in how
effort, intelligence, and resources are packaged. What
combination succeeds? The answer is, in a sense, in plain
view. The successful blend of institutional effort ties together
a science with the practical, effective technologies from
whose principles they arise and these in turn are closely
linked to organizational arrangements that appropriately
deliver and execute that science and its derivative
technologies.
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Integration of Science, Technology, and Organization
In the successful endeavors of any institutional effort
such as those of agriculture, manufacturing, and
transportation, we can observe the effective integrating of
science, technology, and organization. One of the sectors
previously mentioned, that of agriculture, illustrates the
successful relation between the three factors. We entertain
the romantic image of the solitary farmer looking at the sky,
sniffing the wind, rubbing earth between thumb and
forefinger. That still happens. But the farmer has buddies
in the sky. Satellites with global positioning systems map
to a few centimeters which portions of his land yield most.
Meteorologists provide up-to-date weather forecasting over
the internet directly to his personal computer. Sensors on
his combines tell him which plants he should weed and
which he should harvest. He increasingly adjusts to the
variability of what he plants and therefore of the yield
through feedback of the effects of herbicides, pesticides,
and nutrients. He predicts plant outcomes against objectives
to check plant quality, and controls processes to attain that
quality. The farmer manages these science-based technologies
in coordination with agronomists, extension agents, and
farming cooperatives. So, in sum, what do we have? Two
basic sciences, biology and physics, within whose powerful
frameworks a number of subsidiary sciences operate such
as agronomy and meteorology. These spawn and support
sophisticated technologies operating through feedback that
compares results with objectives. But note that more than
science and technology is necessary. The extent of the
knowledge involved and the reach of the skills required
demand a team approach to the large-scale growing of
inexpensive food. The farmer is but one member of a vast
organization of a specialized division of labor. The science
and the technology would not operate effectively without
this division of labor. The agricultural miracle would be but
a mirage of hopes, as is our current system of education.
Take any sector of society. Reflect upon it. Without
effective technologies based on valid sciences operated
through a complex division of labor whose diverse expertise
is linked by proper organization, the sector would achieve
little. The modern hospital organizes dozens of specialists.
As exemplified by the operating room, many work as small
teams that fuse their diverse repertoires for a given objective.
Modern medicine would not be possible without modern
organization. And clearly, the highly effective technology
of large-scale industrial production came about through
modern forms of management and organization. These
resulted from innovations in the processing of materials, for
example the assembly line, and in corporate governance,
for example, the multidivisional structure. Whatever the area
of endeavor, institutional success requires the powerful
integrating of organization, science, and technology.
Technology, when effective, displays certain
characteristics. What are these? To start with, reliability—
that almost every time an effect is desired, it occurs. Who
now can say that if a lecture is effective on one occasion it
will be on the next? Or if a lesson plan succeeds at one
time, it will at the next? And detectability—if an effect does
not occur we can find out why, either by checking back
against the science or through the internal feedback
mechanisms of the technology itself. With educational
technology, what now happens? Masses of students gather
at prescribed times to take tests, and amid the welter of
inferences justifying or explaining or condemning the results
do any speculations unambiguously sort out the instructional
techniques responsible for the results? No. What must we
require, and why? For optimal operation, feedback
mechanisms of any technology depend on consistent detailed
real-time point-to-point information on the relation between
outcomes and the operations that produce those outcomes.
A productive instructional technology would match each
student action with exactly that element of the instructional
technique that produces an effect and would obtain the
results immediately. It is a poor sort of technology that waits
for years or months or weeks or even the next day to find
out whether a technique worked or how well it worked. And
that is the situation with current instructional evaluation.
Not knowing what is happening at the time it is happening
is like painting a portrait blindfold then coming back after
a month, seeing it for the first time and trying to figure out
why the outcome occurred as it did. Knowing the functional
relation between technique and result provides the basis for
innovation, especially when the proper organizational base
takes advantage of the data and when analysis occurs within
the technology’s scientific framework.
Scientific principles initiate the baseline effectiveness
and maintain the continual improvement of any technology,
including the instructional one. Good science permits
predictions that can be observed and checked out. Good
science supplies relevant reasons for technical practices.
Good science facilitates technological expansion into arenas
not previously foreseen and the undertaking of problems
whose solutions were not previously possible. We see the
effect of good science in such endeavors as the engineering
of the human genome or the exploring of the planet Mars.
With rare exceptions, we suffer from the absence of good
science in education. Without good science we work with
hand-me-down nostrums useful only in very circumscribed
circumstances. All instructional techniques become local.
What is accomplished depends upon art and accident.
But equally important as effective technology and good
science is the social union by which and through which a
technology operates.
Organization is often overlooked when discussing science
and technology. Subtle and esoteric sciences and exacting
and complex technologies require skilled repertoires; a
variety of them. But more than varied skills are required.
People work together to accomplish what they could not do
separately. In short, they organize. They coordinate practices
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so that different skills complement each other. To work
together with the technology applied to a given effort, from
auto making to open heart surgery, from producing planes
to farming foodstuffs, such complementarity of skills must
be sequenced and integrated in the correct order.
Infrastructures within the organization sort the correct
collection of skills, for example in industrial firms the
infrastructures of finance, marketing, and production, among
others. These infrastructures must suit the type of technology
in use. Some technologies demand a hierarchical structure;
others demand a team-based operation. Infrastructures that
fit their technologies constitute a good organization. If a
technology changes so also must the way people organized
to deal with it. A new form of technology calls for a new
type of organizational structure.
Education and the Triad of Science, 
Technology, and Organization
In looking at the interacting science, technology, and
organization components within the arena of education, we
come to an inevitable conclusion based on its comparative
record of success in relation to other institutional sectors.
The educational sector requires an overhaul of the triad of
the current science, current technology, and current
organization, and in overhauling these components, as
important as science and technology are, so is organization.
We need to change the science and to change the technology.
As well and appropriate to these changes, we need to install
a completely new organization. We need to innovate not
only in one component, but in all three. The prevalent
science, the typically encountered instructional technology,
and their accompanying organization have not and can not
handle the problems of mass education.  
Science and Education
The current underlying behavioral sciences for education
are driven by a particular assumption—that of an inner causal
agency. The assumption forces a focus on the person.  Inside
a person, an entity is said to direct and cause that person’s
behavior. The entity may be a personification of the
individual—an ego or self or mind. Even behaviorists bring
in that agency. Keller in his Personalized System of
Instruction, PSI, talks about self-paced instruction as if a
self paced the action through the instructional modules. A
more updated version of the inner causative agency makes
it a structure or a process, cognitive for example. But there
is still an entity that does the thinking or remembering, that
perceives events and interprets them, that has memory with
which to recall its past, that inherits linguistic ability to
generate sentences and decide what to say, that is receptive
and expressive about language. It is so ubiquitous we take
it for granted. Our language is at one with that notion: We
and I determine what we do, and You and They, He and
She, determine what other people do. 
But almost all of the analysis of what goes on within
the individual is inferential. For much of current cognitive
science, the action observed merely gives an opportunity
to get at the real stuff. From the action observed, that real
stuff must be inferred. Clearly, the danger in this sort of
analysis is circularity. It becomes agencies all the way back
until an inscrutable one is reached. Alternatively, a sideways
reductionist leap may be made, and it is said that the
cause is nothing more than left brain synaptic changes or
the molecular configurations of proteins, or some
such. Agencyism, however, is a dead end. Reductionism
inappropriate. Neither causal alternative is helpful to the
teacher in the classroom and to the designer of an
instructional system.
It should be understood clearly that the argument
advanced here is not against inference. There is nothing
wrong with inference. All scientists engage in it and all
sciences accommodate concepts based on inferences. Many
astronomers have long assumed that our solar system is not
unique; that planets revolve around other stars. With better
techniques and instruments and hard observational work,
that assumption has paid off. Over a hundred exoplanets
have been discovered. One of the four planet detection
techniques measures shifts in the star’s spectrum as light is
pulled away or pulled towards us by a planet orbiting that
star. Of course it could still be argued that “something else”
might produce the shifts and that saying it is a planet is
merely an inference. But direct infrared imaging of planets
is now planned. In the sciences, eventually either accurate
prediction or direct observation or practical results must
affirm what is inferred. With respect to these criteria, what
is the record of the prevalent agency-infused science
underlying education? It is dismal. That is why much of it
has retreated into reductionism—to physiology, to genetics,
and to computer-based metaphors.
The evidence for the prevalent circularity based on
agencyism is sterility of results. Millions of words have been
spoken and written about instructional technology, but with
an outcome of only a few practical results—essentially by
accident. A few inspired folks like Montessori had some
success with their instructional techniques. But when people
adopt the Montessorian technique, they duplicate Montessori’s
model. They do not generate new techniques from a powerful
science. We see such barren “innovation” not only at the
elementary level, but at the university level as well. As Morris
Bishop (1970, pp. 265, 268) dryly concludes,
“The word universitas means no more than “the
corporation.” Its first recorded appearance is in a letter of
Pope Innocent III in 1208 or 1209. The first university was
at Salerno in Italy, followed by others at Bologna, Paris,
Montpellier, and Oxford …
The students assembled for class in rented rooms or
halls, or in churches. They sat on hard benches or on the
VARGAS144
THE TRIAD OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ORGANIZATION 145
straw-covered floor, taking notes with styluses on wax
tablets. The professor read some standard text, then
expounded and commented on it, then, usually permitted
criticism and discussion by the students. Pedagogic methods
have not changed much.” In education, this agency-infused
causality has been in place for centuries. Not much science
and little useful technology has resulted.
If we banish the indwelling agency, what are we left
with as cause? We are left with physical or biological or
behavioral events. There are no other kind. We banished
agency from the physical analysis of phenomena. Boreaus
no longer makes the north wind blow nor does Neptune
cause storms at sea. At a more subtle level, notice that when
Newton talked of apples and moons, he was not analyzing
their qualities; and it is a waste of our time to analyze the
qualities of someone’s presumed mind. When Galileo rolled
balls down inclined planes, he analyzed the relation between
angle and motion. He was not trying to analyze where the
ball stored its movements anymore than we should be trying
to analyze where people store their behavior. Though
agencyism has been mostly expunged from biology, the last
remnant of a struggle continues there. Molecular biology
vanquished the final vestiges of vitalism from biology, but
intelligent design, and thus by inference an intelligent
designer, is offered as an explanation as the alternative to
natural selection for the facts of evolution. Though much
of this agency struggle is no longer internal to biology
(unlike that of the behavioral sciences), but driven by
external cultural forces, part of the problem has to do with
the form of explanation that Darwin offered. It is a form of
explanation characteristic of the science that should underpin
education.
The predominant form of explanation primarily in the
physical sciences, still prevalent in the biological ones, and
common in everyday life is push, result. An antecedent cause
produces a subsequent outcome. Everyday discourse, as well
as weighty tomes, insist that for any action, something had
to determine or someone had to decide beforehand what
would occur. But what if the effect were due to something
that happened after the action? The notion is counterintuitive.
Yet this was Darwin’s great insight at the level of species
change. And it was Skinner’s at the level of individual
behavioral change. Explanation can occur, of course, by
observing events that come before what happens. But we
can also provide an explanation by observing events that
come after the action of interest. All the demurrers about
inference still stand, but now apply to causes subsequent to
the activities of interest.
What about the individual? He or she is a location of
action, like Galileo’s ball, but not the reason for the action.
The current situation is also a location. It is the interaction
between the two that produces the characteristics, the
properties, of actions. The focus now becomes the relation
between actions and other events. The analysis and the
explanation starts with the events that come after; though
eventually, those events that come before are considered
in relation to these subsequent events. But our analysis
must take a step further, for the effects are not even on the
actions. It is on their properties. What happens to these
properties of actions becomes contingent upon their
consequences. These determine the values of their direction,
their frequency, their latency, their duration, and any other
properties that can be analytically isolated. Such an analysis
is not psychic, not physicalistic, not physiological, but an
analysis of contingency-based relations, under the rubric
of the science of behaviorology, formulated upon the
feedback reciprocities between properties of actions and
postcedent and antecedent events functioning as independent
variables (Vargas, 1996a). Skinner’s work (1938/1991)
originated the science. It leads to a unique instructional
technology.
Technology and Education
The basic etymological notion of the word, technology,
is techniques; “techne” from its Greek origins, meaning a
systematic way of doing things. So the word here does not
refer to tool technology—movie projectors, television,
computers, the internet, and the like. These are mass
communication tools. Much of the innovation in education
has been the adoption of these tools. As early as the first
part of the 20th century Edison claimed that movie projectors
would revolutionize education and solve our instructional
problems. The same claims were made for the computer.
Now it is heard about the internet. These are tools from the
physical sciences. They are useful. They reduce the per unit
cost for reaching more people. But they are not innovations
in instruction. The instructional gains from these tools, for
example computers, have been minimal. They do not by
themselves improve the effectiveness of instruction.
Effectiveness depends on the instructional techniques, the
process methods, designed for those tools to deliver. Process
quality dictates what the tools accomplish. As programmers
and instructional designers say, “Garbage in, garbage out”.
The quality of the tools—the projector, the computer, the
internet—depends on advances in the physical sciences. But
any effective instructional process must be based on the
behavioral sciences. Instructional technology deals with what
people do, say, think, and feel. What it accomplishes with
these aspects of actions defines the quality of an instructional
technology’s process, and those aspects vary considerably
among people.
The critical characteristic of all student actions is their
variability. The variability of repertoires with which
education must contend presents its central problem. It is
this variation that should constitute the all-absorbing focus
of any instructional technology. No matter how small the
class, each repertoire of each student varies in each of the
cardinal dimensions that must be instructed: knowing,
solving, and creating. Imagine two students in front of an
VARGAS146
instructor. At any point of a lesson one student knows more
than the other. Or if these students know more or less the
same, one solves more easily a problem with the material
both know equally well. And of course creatively they will
differ. Furthermore, such differences will vary at different
points of the instructional sequence with each of the students
involved. Even if an instructor faced only one complex
repertoire, it varies over time in desire, attentiveness,
performance, and so on.
The luxury of teaching only two students, much less
one, rarely occurs. Instead instructors face the problem of
instructing tens, hundreds, even thousands of students in the
same material at the same time.  Mass education has raised
the problem of variability to a crisis level. Variation should
be the target of our instructional models. It raises problems
that cannot be solved with the current instructional model,
and that model’s track record is not the only evidence of its
inability to succeed.
Take a quick look at the present model of delivering
instruction. It is basically a model from the physical sciences.
The teacher transmits information. (The teacher functions
as a transmitter.) The student receives information. (The
student is a receiver.) The student processes this information.
(The student’s processing was at one time a rough analogue
to a telephone exchange system; now the metaphor for
processing is that of the computer’s—input, storage, retrieval,
process, and output.) The presumed explanation of
performance is in how the student does the processing. It
is asserted that the student decides to act, comprehend, store
in long or short term memory, and so on. These are the
familiar expressions of the agency-infused underlying
science. The current instructional technology ignores the
variation in behavioral properties for the predicated
essentialist nature of the student acting as a receiver and
processor. The presentation technology model follows the
agency framework exactly. But merely presenting
“information” does not work. Even at universities with the
most sophisticated experts on their faculty and with
extraordinary entrance standards for their students; even at
places like Harvard or Oxford or the Sorbonne, only a small
percentage of students excel; most get by. A substantial
fraction of university students never finish, regardless of
the country or higher education system and whether public
or private. This presentation technology is a technology as
simple as can be obtained. A person talks, others listen. A
person writes, others read. A person demonstrates, others
watch. Presentation technology has been around since we
have had education, and certainly for the university since
its beginning in the high middle ages. It is easily designed
for whatever delivery device is currently favored, such as
the internet, and for the mythical student, such as the
“average” one. 
Presentation technology works like prefit tailoring. It is
like asking a tailor to  come up with clothes that would fit
a hundred students, and that tailor cutting and sewing the
same set of clothes based on a conjectured build of a typical
student. Most students would not fit into the precut outfit.
Students could be asked to recut and resew until off-the-
rack clothes fit; that is what is done with homework. To
address their individual shapes and forms, one-size-fits-all
tailoring would not be done with their bodies. It should also
not be done with their repertoires. We need an instructional
technology that takes into account the variability in
repertoires.
The technology that takes into account variability is a
contingency-based technology. Given a history of both
activity and circumstance, the descriptor contingency-based
makes clear that any activity, inner or outer, is contingent
upon the circumstances, body and setting, in which it occurs.
Behaviorological science provides the operating maxim:
actions and their differing properties are the focus of effort,
not students. (Students are the aim of ethical effort, not
technical manipulation.) Each action carries properties which
provide an opportunity to alter them according to
instructional objectives. Two basic strategies emerge: either
the form of the action is altered by altering its properties or
the controls under which an action occurs are altered. Drama
coaches change the effect of speech by changing how loudly
or how softly, how quickly or how slowly, and so on, text
is vocalized. In other instructional situations, properties of
an action are not addressed, only the controls that evoke it.
Note that in multiple-choice tests the same simple motion—
picking an answer by marking or pressing—is involved
under differing stimulus controls that typically are textual.
Of course, much instruction merges both types of strategies,
altering both the action form and the stimulus features to
which it must respond, such as in teaching how to play the
guitar. Though complexity of the instructional task is
compounded when sequencing various actions forms and
various types of controls, the same basic principles are
involved. For example, frequency is a common property
that is altered by changing the probability of making a
response (or a set of responses) within a given unit of time.
Dealing with the frequency of actions provides alternative
techniques for dealing with presumed causal qualities
currently called “motivation” and “memory”. And so on
with each of the properties of actions and situations. In all
these issues, situational consequences and circumstances
drive the pattern and energy of actions, and change the
particular action form given by its matrix of property values.
The complexity becomes enormous; a complexity barely
touched.
This complexity now begins to be addressed by an
increasing number of contingency-based instructional
technologies, and though many and diverse their process
characteristics allow a rough and ready classification. We
can classify the techniques of these instructional technologies
in two general groups, perhaps three. The first is shaping.
Each behavioral change is done a bit at a time. Outcome
and feedback dictate the next stimulus feature and action
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property of an instructional program. Shaping by and large
depends on consequating the shift in a given direction of a
particular property of an action. (For an interesting discussion
of this matter, see Mechner, 1995). The second is saltational.
Such saltationist technology takes advantage of the fact that
each so-called action and so-called stimulus is really a
confluence of properties that overlaps with properties of
other actions and stimuli. Induction occurs. And with the
right techniques, such as those of equivalence relations and
of joint control (Tu, 2004), induction allows new action
forms to emerge suddenly. Solutional and creative behavior
can be taught. The third type, techniques like fluency training
and positive care, address topics traditionally called
“memory” and “motivation”. As a subset of contingency-
based techniques, precision teaching particularly promotes
frequency techniques to enhance fluency (Calkins, 2003).
But in any given contingency-based technology, for example
that of CABAS (Comprehensive Application of Behavior
Analysis to Schooling, Greer, 2002) or those of Pryor (1999),
instructional designers blend together many of the techniques
of the different categories. (Or if they do not, it is urged
that they do so. See for example, Vargas, J. S., 2003). Other
programs—such as Morrow’s Applied Behavior Consultants
model (Morrow, Terzich, and Williamson, 2004) and Bondy’s
(2002) PECs system that specialize with a particular
population of students such as autistic children—draw
heavily from contingency-based techniques operating within
the framework of Skinner’s analysis of verbal behavior
(Skinner, 1957/2002). Over time, the characterization of
contingency-based instructional technology by its current
classes of techniques will of course alter.
A further characterization is quality control. Contingency-
based teaching technology inherently is a quality control
effort. The science upon which it is based emphasizes the
feedback effect of consequences and the reciprocal feedback
between these consequences and features of the situation
and the activity with which those consequences interact.
Feedback in conjunction with objectives and standards binds
quality control into the technology. Currently that is not the
case with traditional instruction. For example, presentation-
based instruction obtains a record of performance that is
apart from the events responsible for that performance.
Traditional instruction tests students after the learning event.
The crucial relation of the actual teaching and learning
process is not observed. What went on while the student
learned? How were actions being changed? What specific
action occurred and to which particular events and at what
rate? Tests record an effect, not how that effect came about.
Current instructional evaluation focuses on a molar effect,
an overall test score, instead on the specific molecular
aspects of the instructional arrangements responsible for the
differing parts of the student’s performance.
Contrast a contingency-based instructional system: It
provides immediate feedback on the repertoire as that
repertoire changes. It observes and records the relation
between changes in an instructional condition and the
behavior encountered. It separates the production (and
assessment) of performance from a ranking of performance.
This latter factor is quite important, and an overlooked
feature of evaluation. If each part of a repertoire is taught
successfully then the end result is known already. The
performance is at 100 percent successful criterion level.
Ranking in what is known becomes irrelevant. The issue of
grade inflation vanishes. Grade inflation assumes a built-in
failure to teach. It also assumes that the larger portion of
students are not capable of doing well. Grade inflation is
made synonymous with quality inflation. But would anyone
accuse Apple Computer of quality inflation if all its
computers operated, by whatever means measured, at a so-
called “A” level? The president of Harvard University
becomes indignant at the high grade levels and honors of
recent Harvard students. A good deal of noise, emitted at
other campuses as well, is made about a return to standards.
It never seems to enter the considerations of this president,
or of others, that perhaps the Harvard faculty is teaching
better (or despite the presentations, the students are learning
more). It does not occur to him, or to others, because
outcomes have taught him and others that traditional
instructional technology can not increase the quality of
repertoires beyond a certain level for any set of students,
therefore grades that imply otherwise are suspect. Given the
current instructional technologies, people expect, they even
demand, that a certain portion of students fail, or at minimum
not be judged as excellent. And there is another side to this
dismal coin: If the students are good enough, then not
achieving excellence implies a  build-in failure of skill on
the teacher’s part.
An additional and important characterization of
contingency-based instructional technology is the specific
control over instructing behavior. Any instructional
technology must also improve the instructing repertoire.
With the current presentation model workshops and circulars
encourage the instructional nostrums of the day, but these
provide little help as evidenced by the “same old”
instructional quality after the circulars are read and the
workshops attended. But for instructional quality to rise, the
immediate dynamics of the instructional system must affect
instructing behavior. Each contact between the instructional
system and a student action must be accompanied by contact
with instructing activity. What the instructor does must be
contingent on the outcome of student-instruction interaction.
If instructors do not intimately know what happens during
the instructional process how can they innovate rationally?
On what basis do they increase the chances of improving
the student’s performance? How can teachers succeed when
they do not know what steps to take in order to succeed?
In sum, in contingency-based technology the following
dynamic ensues: Quality control is built in since it is based
on the three constituents of quality control: objectives,
standards, and feedback. Detailed feedback, in the form of
the specific relations between action and stimulus properties
and the consequences of contingent outcomes, provides the
means of achieving objectives at given standards. Without
this informative interaction, accountability arrangements
only end up punishing teachers. Standards are necessary,
but they require a means of achieving them.
Organization and Education
New ways of doing things, including those of teaching,
entail different coordinative and communication arrangements.
Contingency-based instructional systems call for a radically
different organization than now exists. The role of a teacher
is not simply to present. The role of an administrator is not
simply to manage. The role of a student is not simply to
learn. At an ethical level, students, teachers, and administrators
are partners in a common enterprise. At a behavioral systems
level, each set of partners’ actions tie tightly to the others.
For example, administrator actions in traditional education
organizations are often divorced from the immediate moment-
to-moment intimate effect of technology procedures. Only
output affects them, not instructional process. In contingency-
based instructional technology, administrators as well as
teachers contact the current effects of the instructional process
on student performance. Knowing what produces an outcome
puts administrators in a better position to allocate instructional
technology resources and to work out this allocation with
the teachers. The profound change in both administrator and
teacher roles reflects the radical change in the apportioning
of teaching responsibilities.
Teaching responsibilities are entailed by teaching
activities. A contingency-based instructional system entails
a diverse, complex, and enormous number of instructional
activities. This more sophisticated technology clarifies the
operations already involved in varying degrees, mostly
neglected or trivialized, in the current attempt to teach. One
operation involves those techniques that will actually change
a repertoire. Another operation involves the evaluation of
the instructional techniques. A third involves the means of
delivering instructional contact—by computer, or video, or
internet for example. A fourth operation, logistics (typically
not undertaken by an instructional staff), individually tracks
multiple repertoires through multiple instructional contexts.
And fifth, last, and certainly not least, a separate operation
considers what is to be taught.
One person cannot handle all of these operations well.
Each of these characteristics of the instructional process
demands its own expertise. As in farming, doctoring, or
manufacturing, the improving of repertoires so that society
values them demands a wide array of expertise. To succeed,
instruction demands expertise in subject matter content, in
instructional design, in evaluation and quality control
techniques, in logistical management, and in presentation
modes. What flows through any school—primary, secondary,
and university—are behavioral repertoires that the
educational organization transmutes and that in so doing
gives them value. To deal effectively with this behavioral
flow demands an appreciation of the mutual reciprocity of
actions and instructions within shifting contexts.
This expertise must be organized to work together. It
occurs when experts that complement each other work as a
cooperative unit. The various experts operate as a team, an
instructional systems team. Not only the content expert, the
traditional role of the teacher, is a teacher. All of the various
experts are teachers. The logistics expert is a teacher. The
evaluation expert is a teacher. The media expert is a teacher.
The instructional designer is a teacher. Without each, the
job could not be done. No one role is greater than any other.
For example, to assess what is to be taught is an important
as what is to be taught or how it is to be taught. Becoming
a team player, however, requires organizationally
subordinating the traditional role of the content expert.
But does being a member of an instructional systems
team lower the impact of the subject matter teacher? Does
being a team member sharing responsibility for teaching
diminish the role of the subject matter expert? And does
being a member of a teaching group limit the influence of
the subject matter expert? Though it might seem so, the
answer to each question is “no”. Being a member of a
teaching team enhances that expert’s role, impact, and
influence. Content experts would now have a good chance
of being effective with their subject matter. Currently the
teaching burden rests on that one person—that subject
matter expert. He or she cannot do it all. The expertise to
do it all simply is not there. Even if we entertained the
implausible scenario that one person had all that expertise—
knowledge of the basic science from which the techniques
are drawn, knowledge of the various aspects of the process
technology, knowledge of sophisticated quality control
techniques, knowledge of various media such as television
or computers and how to program them, and knowledge of
logistics and how to manage them—that one individual
does not have the time. When a book is written, the author
writes it as a content expert. Authors do not engage in the
marketing, designing, illustrating, printing, and all the other
activities involved in getting that book out to the public.
If they attempted to do so, they would end up doing more
of that than of writing. A wide array of different experts
staffs movie making, and not only actors, directors, and
photographers. Movie credits reveal an extraordinary
division of labor. Finally, a last and important point, at the
university level subject matter experts are not hired for their
teaching skills. They are hired for their expertise in physics
or mathematics or music or literature or sociobiology or
anthropology. Rarely do they exhibit the effort in learning
the immense subject matter known as pedagogy. And they
should not be interested in doing so, nor required to do so.
It is a full time job being a good anthropologist or geneticist
or historian, and it takes more than the typical average
workweek effort if these specialists wish to make a
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breakthrough in their fields. In the university, teaching
should be delegated to those interested and skilled in
teaching.
Moving to a restructured organization grounded on a
complex team-based division of labor means that the
organization becomes the “teacher”. In contrast, the current
instructional organization resembles a teaching mall that
houses a scattered array of individuals doing their best,
leaving behind perhaps a Mr. Chips legacy but not an
institution that functions more effectively. The recommended
structural shift contains profound implications, for
organizations share certain properties, regardless of the
institutional sector of their operations. In the educational
sector as well as the industrial or military or any other,
organizations learn. As Chandler (2002, p. 2) points out,
“Individuals come and go, but the organization remains.
Thus, in modern industrial economies the large firm
performs its critical role in the evolution of industries not
merely as a unit carrying out transactions on the basis of
information flow, but, more importantly, as a creator and
repository of product-specific embedded organizational
knowledge.”
What can be said about industrial organizations, as
organizations, can be said about any organization. The current
structural characteristics of educational organizations, whether
primary, secondary, or university, do not facilitate, perhaps
even not permit, their acquiring cumulative knowledge in
their teaching function. For example, whatever level and
domain of educational organization none contains a quality
control unit obtaining performance data from instructional
systems throughout the school, evaluating these data, and
feeding them back to instructional teams for more effective
redesign of instruction. No one can say of any educational
organization, whether James A. Garfield High School or
University of California at Los Angeles or Lafayette College,
that it is three or four or whatever times better in its teaching
function than it was, say, fifty years ago. 
The organization of teaching teams within the primary,
secondary, and higher education levels would differ according
to the missions of the educational institutions involved. For
example, aside from public service, the university has two
great missions: that of research and that of instruction. It
must produce new knowledge and it must produce new
repertoires. Although much lip service is given to teaching,
current university structure favors subject matter by organizing
their faculties in departments such as art, biology, chemistry,
and so on. Instructional systems and their teams would require
a new arrangement. There would be two faculties: those
expert in a subject matter and those expert in teaching. The
university’s faculty would thus be bimodal. This bimodal
faculty would be structured to facilitate research and
instruction, and thus would be organized into instruction
centers and research centers. Research teams would operate
out of the research centers and instructional teams out of the
instruction centers. Researchers and instructors would go
back and forth on each other’s teams depending on interest
and need.  An earlier article of mine summarized a few of
these organizational characteristics (Vargas, E. A. 1996b,
pp.182-183):
The new organization structure emphasizes flexibility,
decentralization of control, and formal dissemination of
information from critical client groups. The design, production,
management, and redesign of instruction by instructional system
teams implies a cluster-type organization—a collaborative effort
of teams of people whose size, members, and jobs may change.
…  Hierarchical levels of control are de-emphasized. For
example, coordinators of instructional systems teams may interact
directly with the vice president for instruction. Information and
documentation teams interact directly with various sectors of
the public, the professions, and the political sphere such as
government. These information and documentation teams directly
access demographic, economic, and other data vital to the
university’s teaching, research, and service missions, and after
analysis of these data, move them to appropriate sectors of the
university.
The specifics of each organization’s structure within any
educational level would depend on a host of factors such
as internal culture, type of student, level of funding, and
outside social pressures.
Social Considerations and Cost
An entangling factor in the complex interplay between
science, technology, and organization is the social milieu in
which this triad of elements engages in its drama. The
conditions, values, and ethics of a society may dictate a
specific thrust in science or the employment of a prevalent
form of technology or encouragement for a particular type
of organization. Or their opposite. Wartime effort accelerated
the understanding of nuclear fission. The samurai warrior
culture of Japan resisted the use of guns. Fundamentalist
religious groups contest research with stem cells. Regardless
of greater achievement in instruction, people inside the
university will find it difficult to accept an organization in
which content experts are not the primary teaching faculty
and within primary and secondary schools team arrangements
may be resisted because they apparently appear to destroy
the authority of the principal. Simply because a better way
of taking action appears plausible does not mean it will be
accepted, much less encouraged.
These considerations often play themselves out
economically. An innovation may not be hazarded because
the budget does not sustain the risk. But not infrequently,
fault-finding disguises itself as fiscal prudence. “We can’t do
it because it would cost too much”, or the more easy rationale,
“How do we know the return will be worth the cost?” These
questions are pertinent. Certainly before a risk is taken, any
reply to the second objection can only be predicated, guessed
at, theorized over. It cannot be factually answered.  
So a relevant question of the triad model is: Would it
cost more? Of course it would. Does it cost a lot to get a
new jetliner in the air? From designing to manufacturing,
the cost runs into billions of dollars; much more than it cost
a couple of bicycle makers to build the first airplane. Take
any example where quality is imperative, reliability is
absolutely necessary, complexity is inherently part of the
process and of the product, and where all these considerations
must suit a large clientele. The same escalation of cost occurs.
But something else also occurs when success follows
undertaking of the outlay: downstream enrichment benefit
to a society, to the institution, to an individual. Factories for
computer chip technology and for producing computers cost
billions. But all benefit from the results. Productivity grows
in all sectors of an economy and all goods cost less on a per
unit basis. And as individuals, we now carry around the
equivalent, twenty years past, of a mainframe.
Who can afford the innovation of the triad model?
Countries outside the United States may be the first; mostly
countries improperly called Third World countries. The label
for these countries, “Third World”, is a misnomer. Such a
label hides the complexities of their economies and their
social structure, even their ambitions (Friedman, 2000). The
label also hides the economic and social realities of so-called
“First World” countries. All countries have their mix of First
World and Third World economies and technologies. It is
the mix, and the ratio of what is mixed that matters. The
United States has more than 40 million people without any
health coverage—roughly one in seven since it has a
population of almost 300 million. Many of these people
trade off costs of provisions for prescriptions. Many go
without both food and medicine. Many live in substandard
housing or are homeless. When we say “many”, we are
talking millions here. A third world economy, society, and
population exists in the U.S. bigger than in many so-called
third world countries.
But how about the situation in education? As Bracey
(2002, pp. 146, and 148-149) points out in the following
two quotes, in California, one of the richest states in the
richest country in the world,
“The American Civil Liberties Union filed a class-action
suit on behalf of a number of poor districts located
throughout California. Claire Cooper of the Sacramento Bee
reported that depositions in the case contained “snapshots
of filth, chaos, and desperation,” such as these:…
• “Rats in cafeterias, one carrying fruit in its mouth, others
scurrying around a bread rack.
• Chemistry labs with no chemicals.
• Literature classes without books.
• Computer classes in which, according to one student, “We
sit there and talk about what we would be doing if we had
computers.””
And in Louisiana, with some of the largest oil and gas
reserves in the richest country in the world, a pair of education
professors “went back to the classroom for a year, teaching
in a poor rural school … Their school had “no library, no
playground equipment, no hot water for washing hands, no
art teachers, no counselor, and one toilet for 72 faculty and
staff. We began our year with no maps, one globe, a shortage
of textbooks, dictionaries from 1952, malfunctioning
heating/cooling systems, and a healthy supply of cockroaches
and other pests.” The students the Johnsons [the education
professors] taught had no trouble sounding out a word like
“waitress” but had no idea what it meant—they had not been
to restaurants that use them.” Symmonds (2002, pp. 124-125),
the executive director of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
sums the situation well, “Among industrialized nations, the
U.S. is unique in having an educational system that provides
the least resources for students with the greatest needs”. A
matter of priorities, isn’t it? Some countries put a lot of their
resources into the leisure and military industries, others invest
elsewhere. Finland’s education ministry budget is a lot larger
than that of the defense ministry. Costa Rica has no military,
but it heavily supports its ecology programs.  Furthermore,
in countries outside the United States, many institutional
sectors, such the military, are not as expensive. The economic
pie in these countries may be smaller but more remains for
education, if that is the priority. 
Any consideration of cost always involves social policy,
considered in light of current resource allocation and over
long-term consequences. In the long run, the underlying
solution of educational costs is demographic. As August Comte,
the founder of sociology put it, “demography is destiny”. If
the population rate is lowered so is the burden of mass
education. The same number of educational dollars or pesos
or yen go further as there are more available on a per unit
basis. The per unit basis introduces the other aspect of cost:
its investment characteristic. Cost by itself is a meaningless
figure. It can only be assessed in terms of its return. The current
return wastes human resources both individually and socially:
• “Students committing suicide when failing university entry
exams.
• High crime rates by the unskilled.
• Poor understanding of the political process.
• Large drop-out rate between primary school entry and high
school exit.
• About half accepted into higher education ever leave with
their degree.”
Those are a few of the dismal facts. Many others are
just as dismal. Such outcomes have been with us from the
beginnings of mass education. They need not continue. Their
cost is higher than any radical new solution. Effective
instruction is possible, but it requires a solution unlike any
other previously attempted even if immediately more costly
and hazardous.
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Conclusion
The relationship between science, technology, and
organization at first appears to be straightforward. A set of
scientific principles supplies an understanding of a given set
of phenomena well enough so that practical techniques—that
is, a technology, or when more rationally sophisticated, an
engineering—derived from those principles can control and
predict that phenomena for everyday use. To wield these
techniques, skill is necessary. When the enterprise is complex
in its operation, the skills are many and varied. To mesh these
diverse skills effectively, they must be controlled and
coordinated. Organizing them becomes necessary. The scale
of operation may be large or small, but organization of mixed
skills expressed through a division of labor becomes necessary
as the scale of difficulty, of size, and of effort increases. 
Clearly, an operation of intricate complexity could be
managed by one person. Though best carried out by a team
of specialists—anesthesiologist, nurse, surgeon, and so on—
in an extreme emergency an operation that opens up the human
body could be conducted by one intrepid individual. In The
Doll Maker, Harriet Arnow (1954/1972, p. 21) describes the
improvised surgery by a Kentucky hill woman, who slices her
child’s throat to prevent it from dying from croup,
…The fingers of her left hand moved quickly over the cut
skin, feeling, pulling the skin apart, holding it, thumb on one
side, finger on the other, shaping a red bowed mouth grinning
up from the child’s neck…
The knife moved again, and in the silence there came a
little hissing. A red filmed bubble streaked with pus grew on
the red dripping wound, rose higher, burst; the child struggled,
gave a hoarse, inhuman cry…
She gently but quickly wiped the blood and pus from the
gaping hole, whispering to the child…  
But no one person could carry out all the tasks necessary
to open up space, to implant an artificial heart, to mine the
ocean floor, or to teach tens of thousands of students
thousands of subjects from art to zoology. The impossibility
of any one person mastering more than one or two subjects
is well recognized in the increasing array of content experts
handling the vertical integration of subject matters. Such
vertical integration—from basic arithmetic to advanced
calculus, say—recognizes the increasing complexity of a
verbal repertoire. Another kind of integration is also
necessary. Overlooked at all levels of education, primary,
secondary, and higher, is the necessary horizontal integration
of the complex components of the instructional process—
design, quality control, and so on—and the reciprocal
feedback that occurs (or should) between them and science
and organization.
Independent of considerations of scale of difficulty and
of effort, in an apparent natural sequence, science foundations
provide the rationale for technologies and these in turn set
the requirements for the skills to operate them which then
set the stage for the structure that best facilitates their
operation. But historically, as well as currently, the interaction
between science, technology, and organization has not been,
and continues not to be, such a straight line outcome. A
tangled interplay reverberates between science, technology,
and organization. Science may evolve from craft as easily,
or with as much difficulty, as craft from science. The analysis
of natural selection in evolution borrowed much from the
work in animal husbandry while on the other hand, genetic
engineering depends considerably upon molecular biology.
Technology can drive the development of a science, as
increasingly powerful telescopes did in astronomy. And
without the proper organization to execute them well, both
science and technology may languish. Building the atom
bomb and working out its physics, was due as much to an
achievement in organization as it was in science and
technology. In the interplay between science, technology,
and organization, any point in their mutual effect from which
to state a causal analysis is as good as any other.
Such an analytic given does not mean that one neglects
or overlooks or excludes any of the three required
components in putting in place a contingency-based
instructional system. Any attempt to initiate a contingency-
based instructional technology will require setting it within
the proper organizational structure and designing it from
the proper scientific foundation. What the “analytic given”
does mean is that in how such placement is done no set
recipe as to how to proceed can be offered. Each educational
organization presents its nuances of culture, of people, of
resources, of all the myriad characteristics that make it a
unique entity. Those most immediately in contact with the
problems of integration can best solve them.
Summary
We recap the following fundamentals. For optimal
success, in any large scale enterprise the organization of the
division of labor must fit the technology through which that
enterprise achieves its mission. This is as true in the large
scale enterprise of education as those, for example, of
agriculture, manufacture, and transportation. As with other
institutional efforts that show success, educational technology
must tie directly to a pertinent science and to a fitting
organizational structure.
We can summarize further. Solving the problem of
teaching well requires an overhaul of our educational system
with three concurrent endeavors: One, a new technology of
instruction, a contingency-based system of instruction, that
becomes an engineering enterprise with practices derived
and dependent upon suitable scientific principles; two, a
relevant science that reflects and encapsulates a different
understanding of behavior; three, a process-based
organization designed around the control and coordinative
necessities of an instructional division of labor based on
teaching teams. Each part of the solution requires the others.
Such intimate dependency leads to our final summation.
Science and technology and organization complement each
other. No part solely determines the outcome of the other two;
instead each affects and in turn is affected by the others. A
complex interplay of feedback ensues. Emphasizing the
importance of their dependent interplay, however, does not
underplay the effect of power on an educational organization
from other sources, for example, business, political, or religious
special interests. But their impact on teaching quality can best
be judged once we take into account how within the educational
enterprise to bind together science, technology, and organization.
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